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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Olson appeals the district court's decision to summarily dismiss his postconviction petition.

Mr. Olson contends that the district court erred by not granting

his requested continuance of the June 15, 2012, summary disposition hearing, thereby
depriving him of effective assistance of counsel. He also contends that, based on the
district court's and counsel's representations concerning what they wanted to do at that
hearing, as well as the procedures employed, the June 15, 2012, hearing was only a
summary disposition hearing.

Finally, he asserts that the district court improperly

summarily denied several of his claims at that time.
The State responds, contending that counsel had sufficient time to prepare and
was, in fact, prepared. That argument is meritless, as it ignores the context and facts
surrounding counsel's statements in that regard. All counsel told the district court was
that he was prepared to allow Mr. Olson to try and justify his allegations, but that was
not what he had been appointed to do.

Counsel's statements, as well as his intentions

for the June 15, 2012, hearing reveal that he was not prepared to effectively assist
Mr. Olsen in defending his allegations against summary judgment. He certainly was not
prepared to proceed if the hearing were, as the State believes, a full evidentiary
hearing.
The State's argument that the June 15, 2012, hearing was a full evidentiary
hearing relies primarily on the scheduling orders.

That argument impermissibly

promotes form over substance. It also ignores the assertions by both the district court
and defense counsel as to what they intended to do at the June 15, 2012, hearing. In
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fact, if the State were correct, then Mr. Olson would have been deprived of his due
process rights to notice and a full, fair, and meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Additionally, if it were an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Olson should have been afforded
post-conviction relief.

He presented evidence in support of his claims and the State

offered nothing to weigh against that evidence.

As such, a preponderance of the

evidence shows that Mr. Olson proved his claims. Therefore, because the district court
erred by summarily dismissing claims presenting genuine issues of material fact, this
Court should remand the case for further proceedings, to be held after Mr. Olson is
given sufficient time to prepare for those proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Olson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred by not affording Mr. Olson sufficient time to
discuss his potential claims with post-conviction counsel so that he might develop
them into viable post-conviction claims, which was the point of the Court of
Appeals' decision to remand this case following the initial, inappropriate summary
dismissal of those claims.

2.

Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. Olson's petition
for post-conviction relief in the face of at least one genuine issue of material fact.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Not Affording Mr. Olson Sufficient Time To Discuss
His Potential Claims With Post-Conviction Counsel So That He Might Develop
Them Into Viable Post-Conviction Claims, Which Was The Point Of The Court Of
Appeals' Decision To Remand This Case Following The Initial, Inappropriate
Summary Dismissal Of Those Claims
The State misunderstands Mr. Olson's argument that he was not afforded
sufficient time to prepare for the June 15, 2012, hearing.

He is not arguing for a

conclusion that, as a matter of law, forty-three days is insufficient time to prepare for a
hearing. (See Resp. Br., p.8.) Rather, Mr. Olson is arguing that the continuance should
have been granted because the unique facts of this case demonstrate that counsel was
unprepared to proceed on June 15, 2012. (See App. Br., pp.8-14.) The effect of forcing
Mr. Olson to proceed when his counsel was clearly unable to assist him deprived
Mr. Olson of his right to effective assistance of counsel.
The record reveals that counsel was unable to offer Mr. Olson effective
assistance in presenting his claims to the district court. Relying on counsel's assertion
that he had already evaluated the claims not resolved by the decision in Olson v. State,
2012 Unpublished Opinion No.398, pp.5-6, 9 (Ct. App. 2012) (hereinafter, Olson//), the
State contends that post-conviction counsel was ready to proceed on the remaining
claims.

(See Resp. Br., p.7 (citing Tr., Vol.4, p.27, L.16 - p.28, L.18).)

However,

counsel's assertions indicate nothing of the sort. Counsel informed the district court:
I'm telling the Court that I have investigated this case before and filed a
second amended petition, which I believe had merit, and that case was
fully litigated. So I'm in a position here where I'm trying to do, basically,
follow the mandates of the Appellate Court and this Court in terms of
telling the Court what the claims are. But if you're asking me whether I've
conducted an investigation of claims and believe that the claims have
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merit, that's a different matter, and I can't really comment on that, other
than to say that I have -- I have tried to proceed professional by providing
the appropriate pleadings before, which are not at issue today before the
Court. So that's where I'm at professionally. I feel like I'm kind of being
bound here in the record into asserting things -- half of the merit of my
client [sic] -- when that's not what I've been directed to do. So to the
extent that I can provide assistance to the Court in elucidating what it is he
wants to testify or assert here, I'm happy to do that.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.27, L.20 - p.28, L.18 (emphasis added).) The entirety of post-conviction
counsel's comments actually undermines the State's argument that he had investigated
the still-pending allegations and was ready to proceed.
Besides ignoring the context of counsel's statements, the State's contention that counsel had previously reviewed those claims and was sufficiently prepared to
pursue them (Resp. Br., pp.6-7) - also ignores the procedural history of this case.

For

example, counsel specifically asserted that his original efforts on the case were directed
at the matters identified in the second amended petition. (Tr., Vol.4, p.27, L.21 - p.28,
L9; compare R., Vol.1, pp.5-19 (the original petition and affidavit in support) with
R., Vol.1, pp.100-104 (the second amended petition filed by post-conviction counsel).)
As post-conviction counsel pointed out, none of the issues presented in the second
amended petition remained before the district court on remand, as they had been
resolved in Olson II. (Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.3-10.) It is, of course, necessary to remember
why this case was remanded in the first place:

the district court had improperly

summarily dismissed the claims that were not addressed in the second amended
petition before appointing counsel to represent Mr. Olson. Olson II, 2012 Unpublished
Opinion No.398, pp.5-6, 9. As such, post-conviction counsel would have had no reason
to fully investigate those claims, as the district court had already dismissed them by the
time he was appointed to represent Mr. Olson.
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In fact, post-conviction counsel told the district court, in regard to the claims still
pending, all he was ready to do on June 15, 2012, was "provide assistance to the Court
in elucidating what it is [Mr. Olson] wants to testify or assert here .... " (Tr., Vol.4, p.28,
Ls.15-17; see also Tr., Vol.4, p.11, Ls.19-22 ("My intention would be to put Mr. Olson on
the stand and have him go through basically the original petition . . . have him go
through each one of the claims that he set forth.").)

The State counters, relying on

counsel's assertion that he "was ready to proceed," again without discussing the context
of that assertion. (See Resp. Br., p.7.) Immediately after making that statement, postconviction counsel went on to clarify exactly what it was he was prepared to do: "I'm
prepared to proceed.

I've also gone through the original decision and have my own

analysis of what it is I think we're supposed to do here today. My intention would be to

put Mr. Olson on the stand and have him go through basically the original petition ...
have him go through each one of the claims that he set forth."

(Tr., Vol.4, p.11,

Ls.19-24 (emphasis added).) Counsel's clarification reveals that he was not ready to
effectively assist Mr. Olson in pursuing the unresolved claims.

Rather, he was only

prepared to let Mr. Olson attempt to justify his allegations to the district court.
The State takes the same approach to another portion of counsel's statements
trying to support its claim.

(Resp. Br., p.7 (quoting Tr., Vol.4, p.13, Ls.10-13).) Yet

again, the statement quoted by the State is taken out of context.

It is immediately

preceded by counsel's reassertion of his plans for the hearing and the request for
additional time:
[M]y understanding of how to prepare for today is that we go through and
have Mr. Olson testify as to what kind of a basis he has for each one of
those claims. And in that regard that's what I'm prepared to do today with
regard to his testimony. Of course my client has indicated he'd like more
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time to prepare, but I told -- I told the client that based upon my
understanding of what the Court's instructions were today, if there is
something that develops from this hearing in his testimony, and the
State -- the Court is going to give the State additional time to brief it or
submit additional evidence, we would ask for the same time to respond or
present a response to that. But, in general, I think as far as I understood
the Court's desire to move forward in terms of developing evidence today,
I'm prepared to do that
(Tr., Vol.4, p.12, L19 - p.13, L.13 (emphasis added).)

Counsel clearly qualified his

assertion that he was ready to proceed, asserting that all he was prepared to do was
allow Mr. Olson the opportunity to try and explain his allegations.

In counsel's mind, he

had not been appointed to do more: "I feel like I'm kind of being bound here in the
record into asserting things -- half the merit of my client [sic] -- when that's not what I've
been directed to do."

(See Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.10-14.)

A full examination of post-

conviction counsel's assertions demonstrates the error in the State's argument that he
was ready to provide effective assistance to Mr. Olson.
In fact, the transcript of the June 15, 2012, hearing reveals that post-conviction
counsel did not fully understand Mr. Olson's remaining claims. (See Tr., Vol. 4, p.18,
L.6 - p.28, L.21; compare, p.31, L.8 - p.94, L.22 (Mr. Olson's clarifications of his
claims).) As such, he would not, at that point, be able to effectively assist Mr. Olson
pursue relief for the alleged errors. Therefore, the State's assertion that post-conviction
counsel was ready to proceed and was prepared to assist Mr. Olson in pursuing postconviction relief on those claims is meritless.
As a result of counsel's underpreparedness, Mr. Olson was asking for additional
time to prepare to adequately argue his remaining claims to the district court.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.12, L.25 - p.13, L.9; Tr., Vol.4, p.14, Ls.14-24.) As demonstrated by the
record, post-conviction counsel was not prepared to provide meaningful assistance in
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that endeavor at the June 15, 2012, hearing.

Therefore, the record clearly

demonstrates that, by not granting the continuance and compelling Mr. Olson to attempt
to avoid summary dismissal of his claims at the hearing on June 15, 2012, the district
court deprived Mr. Olson of effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. See, e.g.,
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189 and 189 n.3 (Ct. App. 2008); Griffin v. State, 142

Idaho 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2006).
The State responds that, since Mr. Olson had more time to work with postconviction counsel than other petitioners who had been found to have sufficient time to
prepare, he cannot make this argument on appeal.

(Resp. Br., pp.5-6 (citing

Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 277-78 (1945); January v. State, 127 Idaho 634, 638

(Ct. App. 1995)). However, the mere fact that Mr. Olson had more time to try to prepare
his case with counsel's help than the petitioners in January and Hawk does not mean
that Mr. Olson or post-conviction counsel had sufficient time to prepare themselves.
The specific facts of those two cases indicated that the petitioners had sufficient time to
discuss the matters with counsel and prepare to proceed.

Hawk, 326 U.S. at 278;

January, 127 Idaho at 638. However, the application of the standards outlined in those

cases to the specific facts of this case reveals that Mr. Olson did not have sufficient time
to prepare, and thus, was forced to proceed without the effective assistance of counsel.
(See App. Br., pp.12-14.)
The record demonstrates that post-conviction counsel was not ready to proceed
as an effective advocate for Mr. Olson's allegations.
Mr. Olson's own attempts to explain his claims.

He was only ready to facilitate

Therefore, when the district court

denied his request for a continuance, Mr. Olson was compelled to proceed without the
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effective assistance of counsel in explaining and pursuing his claims for relief (at least
one of which presented a genuine issue of material fact). (See App. Br., pp.8-19.) As
such, this Court should remand this case so Mr. Olson can have sufficient time to
discuss his claims with counsel.

11.

The District Court Erroneously Summarily Dismissed Mr. Olson's Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief In The Face Of At Least One Genuine Issue Of Material Fact
The State does not respond to Mr. Olson's argument that summary dismissal
was inappropriate since he raised at least one genuine of material fact.

Rather, it

mistakenly contends that, simply because the hearing on June 15, 2012, was scheduled
as an evidentiary hearing, that automatically means that it was an evidentiary hearing.
First, the scheduling order does not identify that the hearing specifically as an
evidentiary hearing. Second, the comments of the district court and counsel reveal that
the June 15, 2012, hearing was only ever intended to be a hearing on summary
dismissal. Additionally, the procedures employed at that hearing demonstrate that it
was, in fact, a hearing on summary dismissal. The State's argument to the contrary
only serves to improperly promote form over substance.
Furthermore, if the State were correct, then the evidentiary hearing would have
failed to comport with the requirements of procedural due process. Additionally, if the
State were correct, then Mr. Olson would have been entitled to post-conviction relief,
since the evidence he presented, which was uncontroverted, would have proved his
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
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1. The June 15, 2012, Hearing Was Not An Evidentiary Hearing
The hearing was only scheduled as a hearing "for Post Conviction Relief."
(R., Vol.2, pp.5, 12.)

As such, the State's contention that "the district court

unambiguously ordered an evidentiary hearing," is obviously mistaken.

(See Resp.

Br., p.10.) In fact, the district court's own assertions at the May 2, 2012, hearing belie
that argument, revealing that the district court was not planning on having an evidentiary
hearing on June 15, 2012: "And so I'm simply going to set it for hearing . . . . And then

depending on the outcome of that and the court's ruling, we can reset it if the State
chooses to present any evidence . . . in opposition to anything that comes up at the
hearing." (Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.19 - p.2, L.1 (emphasis added).) The assertion that the
hearing would be reset if a presentation of evidence became necessary shows that the
district court was only planning on making determinations based on summary dismissal
standards at the June 15, 2012, hearing.
The district court reaffirmed that perspective at the June 15, 2012, hearing.
It asserted that the purpose of the June 15, 2012, hearing was only to clarify what
issues remained to be resolved after the case had been remanded, not to hear
evidence on those claims:

"I want to go through what is going to be pursued by

Mr. Olson today, and then what we're going to do is set this at a later date .... I want to
know what's left to proceed on." (Tr., Vol.4, p.17, Ls.14-21.) In fact, during its initial
recitation of the status of the case, the district court described the purpose of the June
15, 2012, hearing: "if these claims survive this initial hearing date today, then certainly
the State could bring any evidence in at a later point in time." (Tr., Vol.4. p.9, Ls.19-22.)
These statements all reveal that the district court did not intend to hold, nor was it
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holding, an evidentiary hearing on June 15, 2012. Rather, the point of that hearing was
to decide what claims were still viable and which were subject to summary dismissal,
and depending on the district court's decisions in that regard, an evidentiary hearing
would subsequently be calendared. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.16 - p.2, L.1.)
Furthermore, the district court was not even sure that it could properly continue
presiding over this case at an evidentiary hearing: "what we're going to do is set this at
a later date. It may not be before this Court, but I want to give -- and I'll see if I can
continue to hear the post-conviction relief in this case -- but I want to know what's left to
proceed on." (Tr., Vol.4, p.17, Ls.16-21 (emphasis added).) It seems illogical for the
district court to question its ability to preside over an evidentiary hearing and yet, at the
same time, hold that very hearing. As such, the State's contention that the hearing on
June 15, 2012, was supposed to be an evidentiary hearing is clearly belied by the
district court's assertions on the record.
The State's contention - that the June 15, 2012, hearing constituted an
evidentiary hearing since it was purportedly scheduled as an evidentiary hearing - is
also erroneous because it promotes form over substance. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 92
Idaho 827, 830 (1969) ("In considering an application for post-conviction relief, the court
looks to the substance and disregards defects of form.").

In fact, the Idaho Supreme

Court has even determined that if the form of the hearing was improper, the substance
of that hearing will dictate whether the result is appropriate or needs to be reversed.
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 777 (1986). Specifically, the Quick Court determined
that, even though the district court erred by not holding the proper hearing, the
substance of the jury's verdict controlled, which meant that no remand for the proper
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hearing was necessary.

Id.

In so holding, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:

"To

remand for a new trial on such grounds would so elevate form over substance as to
make a mockery of the jury's verdict." Id. The same rationale that the Court applied in
Quick is applicable in this case: the substance of the district court's decisions in this

case constituted summary dismissal.

Affirming on the basis that the hearing was

scheduled as an evidentiary hearing would only serve to impermissibly promote form
over substance.

Compare id.

As such, the hearing should be evaluated on its

substance. See id.
Furthermore, the rules for summary dismissal proceedings provide that the
petitioner have an opportunity to respond to the proposed summary dismissal.
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995) (recognizing that, whether the

district court files notice of intent to summarily dismiss or the State files a motion
requesting summary dismissal, "the petitioner will have an opportunity to respond" to the
proposed summary dismissal of his claims). Since the district court had essentially put
Mr. Olson on notice for the potential of summary dismissal at the May 2, 2012, hearing
(see Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.16 - p.2, L.1), the June 15, 2012, hearing essentially functioned as

Mr. Olson's opportunity to respond to the proposed summary dismissal of his claims.
The fact that he responded by live testimony as opposed to written affidavit is of no
consequence. 1
Therefore, the nature of the June 15, 2012, hearing reveals that it was held for
summary judgment purposes. And even if the nature of the hearing does not make its

The only reason that Mr. Olson had to testify at all on June 15, 2012, is because, as
discussed in detail in Section I, infra, his attorney was not prepared to proceed in regard
to the remaining claims. (See App. Br., pp.8-14.)
1
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purpose clear, there are several additional reasons why the State's contention that it
was actually an evidentiary hearing is unreasonable.

2. The June 15, 2012, Hearing Could Not Have Been An Evidentiary Hearing,
Because, If It Were, Mr. Olson Would Not Have Been Afforded The Necessary
Procedural Due Process Protections, Or, Alternatively, He Would Been Entitled
To Post-Conviction Relief
The State's contention that the June 15, 2012, hearing was an evidentiary
hearing is also shown to be unreasonable because, if it were true, the necessary due
process protections would not have been afforded to Mr. Olson.
Procedural due process requires that "there must be some process to
ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation
of the state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the
defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard." The
opportunity to be heard must occur "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner" in order to satisfy the due process requirement.
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co.

v.

Piper,

133 Idaho 82,

91

(1999) (quoting

State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72 (1991); Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho
923, 927 (1998)); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550-52 (1965). Since
the district court asserted at the May 2, 2012, status hearing that its intent for the June
15, 2012, hearing was to allow the defendant to overcome summary judgment, and if he
was successful, the case would be set for an evidentiary hearing (see Tr., Vol.3, p.1,
L.19 - p.2, L.1 ), allowing it to subsequently change the June 15, 2012, hearing into a
full-fledged evidentiary hearing, as the State contends, would have deprived Mr. Olson
of effective notice. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950); State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542, 545-47 (Ct. App. 2009) (applying Mullane to
find that the defendant had not been given notice of part of the purpose of the hearing).
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Even assuming Mr. Olson would have been provided with sufficient notice, the
procedures employed at that the June 15, 2012, hearing would have deprived Mr. Olson
of a full, fair, and meaningful opportunity to argue his case if it were an evidentiary
hearing. See Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550-52; see also Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co.,
133 Idaho at 91; Castaneda, 130 Idaho at 927. The district court only heard Mr. Olson's
testimony as to the basis for his allegations.

(See generally, Tr., Vol.4; see, e.g.,

Tr., Vol.4, p.64, L.20 - p.67, L.2.) After he offered his explanation for each allegation,
the district court ruled on that particular claim. It did not give him the opportunity after
he had finished offering his testimony to offer additional evidence in support of his
claims. 2 Since he was not given the opportunity to present evidence besides his own
testimony in support of his position (see generally Tr., Vol.4, pp.31-97), the hearing
would not have been a full hearing, nor would it have provided Mr. Olson with a
meaningful opportunity to argue his case. Since, if the June 15, 2012, hearing was an
evidentiary hearing, it would have violated Mr. Olson's procedural due process rights,
the only logical conclusion is that the June 15, 2012, hearing was not an evidentiary
hearing.
Along that same line of analysis, the State's assertion that this was an
evidentiary hearing is unreasonable because, if it were true, then Mr. Olson would have

Presumably, if Mr. Olson had been sufficiently put on notice that this was an
evidentiary hearing, he would have objected to this procedure. However, as counsel
asserted, he did not believe the hearing was to be an evidentiary hearing, and so had
no reason to make such an objection. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.13 ("[M]y
understanding of how to prepare for today is that we go through and have Mr. Olson
testify as to what kind of a basis he has for each one of those claims .... I think as far
as I understood the Court's desire to move forward in terms of developing evidence
today, I'm prepared to do that.").) As it is, this further demonstrates why, if this were an
evidentiary hearing, Mr. Olson would not have received sufficient notice.
2
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been entitled to post-conviction relief, since he would have proved his claims by a
preponderance of the evidence. When a post-conviction claim goes to an evidentiary
hearing, the petitioner has the burden to prove his claims by a preponderance of the
evidence.

See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56 (2004); Cooke v. State, 149

Idaho 233, 244 (Ct. App. 2010). The preponderance of the evidence standard means
that the evidence, "when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force
and from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies therein." Big Butte

Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 9 n.2 (1966); see also Oxley v. Medicine Rock
Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 481 (2003) ("A preponderance of the evidence means
that when weighing all of the evidence in the record, the evidence on which the finder of
fact relies is more probably true than not."); In re Beyer,_ P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion
No.32, p.5 (Ct. App. 2013) ("A preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence
shows something to be more probably true than not.").

Mr. Olson offered unrefuted

testimony in support of his claims for post-conviction relief. (See generally Tr., Vol.4,
pp.31-97.)

The State presented nothing to weigh against that evidence.

Therefore,

Mr. Olson contends that he would have met his burden of proof.
For example, in regard to Issue B, Mr. Olson testified that his attorney promised
that, if he pleaded guilty, he would be sentenced to a fixed term of two to three
years, life indeterminate, to run concurrently with his other sentence. (Tr., Vol.4, p.39,
L.21 - p.40, L.2.) The State offered no testimony to rebut that assertion. (See generally
Tr., R.) Nor does, as the district court asserted, the guilty plea questionnaire contradict
his claim. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.43, L.2 - p.44, L.3.) Rather, the questionnaire shows that
Mr. Olson responded "yes," to the question about whether he had been promised a
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sentence in exchange for his plea. (R., Vol.1, p.74.) The district court did not inquire
about that response before accepting the guilty plea. (See generally Tr., Vol.6, pp.1-9.)
As a result, the only explanations for that answer were Mr. Olson's comment on the
questionnaire (that the State would not negotiate in that regard (R., Vol.1, p.74)), and
his testimony at the June 15, 2012, hearing (that his attorney promised a particular
sentence (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.19 - p.44, L.3)). That is the only evidence in the record on
that issue. As such, the preponderance of the evidence presented in this case would
make it more likely that Mr. Olson's trial attorney promised him the sentence he would
receive, thereby invalidating the guilty plea. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129,
137 (2009); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); State v. Gomez,
153 Idaho 253, 257 (2012); see also Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936 (10th Cir.
1970). As such, if the State were correct and this was an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Olson
would have been entitled to post-conviction relief.
Because the only logical conclusion is that the June 15, 2012, hearing was held
for summary judgment purposes, and because the district court erroneously summarily
dismissed claims raising genuine issues of material fact, this case should be remanded
for an actual evidentiary hearing on those claims. (See App. Br., pp.14-19.)
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Olson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
summarily dismissing his claims for post-conviction relief and remand the case for an
evidentiary hearing with the effective assistance of counsel.

If this Court determines

that the district court did hold an evidentiary hearing on June 15, 2012, Mr. Olson
respectfully requests that it reverse the district court's decision because that hearing
would have violated his procedural due process rights or because he would have
proved his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
DATED this 3 rd day of September, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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